2, a. No less subversive of human responsibility, which is based on purposiveand, therefore, rationalagency, is the existentialist notion that morally good and morally bad action are equally reasonable, and that a choice of one or the other is equally a matter of arational arbitrariness. [83] The desire for happiness is amply the first principle of practical reason directing human action from within the will informed by reason. Lottin, for instance, suggests that the first assent to the primary principle is an act of theoretical reason. The subjective aspect of self-evidence, recognition of underivability, requires that one have such an adequate understanding of what is signified by the principle that no mistaken effort will be made to provide a derivation for it. In defining law, Aquinas first asks whether law is something belonging to reason. [40], Aquinas, of course, never takes a utilitarian view of the value of moral action. correct incorrect Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our intention toward the end. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. Human reason as basis of the goodness and badness of things is faulty, since humans are not perfect. 'An apple a day keeps the doctor away . Here Aquinas indicates how the complexity of human nature gives rise to a multiplicity of inclinations, and these to a multiplicity of precepts. 91, a. cit. Any proposition may be called objectively self-evident if its predicate belongs to the intelligibility of its subject. 2; Summa contra gentiles, 3, c. 2. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided A perfectly free will is that which is not influenced by alien causes Only categorical imperatives are those which can be universal maxims. Nevertheless, the first principle of practical reason hardly can be understood in the first instance as an imperative. [10] In other texts he considers conclusions drawn from these principles also to be precepts of natural lawe.g., S.T. Nonprescriptive statements believed to express the divine will also gain added meaning for the believer but do not thereby become practical. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. S.T. Answer (1 of 10): We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. This point is of the greatest importance in Aquinass treatise on the end of man. The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: In the third paragraph Aquinas begins to apply the analogy between the precepts of the natural law and the first principles of demonstrations. The first precept of natural law is that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Question: True or False According to Aquinas, the first precept of law states, "good is to be done and pursued , and evil is to be avoided," and all other precepts follow from this first precept. But our willing of ends requires knowledge of them, and the directive knowledge prior to the natural movements of our will is precisely the basic principles of practical reason. Ibid. At the beginning of his treatise on law, Aquinas refers to his previous discussion of the imperative. at q. [80] As a particular norm, the injunction to follow reason has specific consequences for right action. (Op. For instance, that the universe is huge is given added meaning for one who believes in creation, but it does not on that account become a matter of obligation for him, since it remains a theoretical truth. Gerard Smith, S.J., & Lottie H. Kendzierski. As I explained above, the primary principle is imposed by reason simply because as an active principle reason must direct according to the essential condition for any active principleit must direct toward an end. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. From the outset, Aquinas speaks of precepts in the plural. His theory of causality does not preclude an intrinsic relationship between acts and ends. One might translate ratio as essence; yet every word expresses some intelligibility, while not every word signifies essence. But the generalization is illicit, for acting with a purpose in view is only one way, the specifically human way, in which an active principle can have the orientation it needs in order to begin to act. 2) Since the mistaken interpretation restricts the meaning of good and evil in the first principle to the value of moral actions, the meaning of these key terms must be clarified in the light of Aquinass theory of final causality. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided, together with the other self-evident principles of natural law, are not derived from any statements of fact. Thus in experience we have a basis upon which reason can form patterns of action that will further or frustrate the inclinations we feel. Only free acceptance makes the precept fully operative. 4, ad 1. This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. 18, aa. This participation is necessary precisely insofar as man shares the grand office of providence in directing his own life and that of his fellows. 94, a. An act which falls in neither of these categories is simply of no interest to a legalistic moralist who does not see that moral value and obligation have their source in the end. In this section I wish to show both that the first principle does not have primarily imperative force and that it is really prescriptive. His response is that law, as a rule and measure of human acts, belongs to their principle, reason. He does make a distinction: all virtuous acts as such belong to the law of nature, but particular virtuous acts may not, for they may depend upon human inquiry. See also Van Overbeke, loc. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that practical knowledge, because it is prior to its object, is independent of experience. [71] He begins by arguing that normative statements cannot be derived from statements of fact, not even from a set of factual statements which comprise a true metaphysical theory of reality. Copyright 2023 The Witherspoon Institute. From the outset, Aquinas speaks of precepts in the plural. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law, with its restrictive understanding of the scope of the first practical principle, suggests that before reason comes upon the scene, that whole broad field of action lies open before man, offering no obstacles to his enjoyment of an endlessly rich and satisfying life, but that cold reason with its abstract precepts successively marks section after section of the field out of bounds, progressively enclosing the submissive subject in an ever-shrinking pen, while those who act at the promptings of uninhibited spontaneity range freely over all the possibilities of life. C. Pera, P. Mure, P. Garamello (Turin, 1961), 3: ch. Let us imagine a teaspoonful of sugar held over a cup of hot coffee. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. The Influence of the Scottish Enlightenment. 3, ad 1) that the precept of charity is self-evident to human reason, either by nature or by faith, since a knowledge of God sufficient to form the natural law precept of charity can come from either natural knowledge or divine revelation. The failure to keep this distinction in mind can lead to chaos in normative ethics. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsens difficulties partly arise from his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics could bridge the gap between theory and practice. B. Schuster, S.J., Von den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Not all outcomes are ones we want or enjoy. [66] Eternal law is the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements of created things in their progress toward their end. 2, a. ODonoghue must read quae as if it refers to primum principium, whereas it can only refer to rationem boni. The primum principium is identical with the first precept mentioned in the next line of text, while the ratio boni is not a principle of practical reason but a quasi definition of good, and as such a principle of understanding. Practical reason, equipped with the primary principle it has formed, does not spin the whole of natural law out of itself. Reason is doing its own work when it prescribes just as when it affirms or denies. Only after practical reason thinks does the object of its thought begin to be a reality. cit. b. the philosophy of achieving happiness through moderate pleasures and avoidance of pain. They ignore the peculiar character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. Moreover, it is no solution to argue that one can derive the ought of moral judgment from the is of ethical evaluation: This act is virtuous; therefore, it ought to be done. Not even Hume could object to such a deduction. Aquinas thinks in terms of the end, and obligation is merely one result of the influence of an intelligible end on reasonable action. Hence it belongs to the very intelligibility of precept that it direct to an end. supra note 11, at 5052, apparently misled by Maritain, follows this interpretation. 2 .Aquinas wrote that "good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided." Aquinas stated that reason reveals particular natural laws that are good for humans such as self-preservation, marriage and family, and the desire to know God. In its role as active principle the mind must think in terms of what can be an object of tendency. In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason. Natural law does not direct man to his supernatural end; in fact, it is precisely because it is inadequate to do so that divine law is needed as a supplement. They are not derived from prior principles. Aquinas, of course, never takes a utilitarian view of the value of moral action. What the intellect perceives to be good is what the will decides to do. A human's practical reason (see [ 1.3.6 ], [ 4.9.9 ]) is responsible for deliberating and freely choosing choices for the human good (or bad). cit. The orientation of an active principle toward an end is like thatit is a real aspect of dynamic reality. supra note 3, at 79. The point of saying that good is to be pursued is not that good is the sort of thing that has or is this peculiar property, obligatorinessa subtle mistake with which G. E. Moore launched contemporary Anglo-American ethical theory. The imperative not only provides rational direction for action, but it also contains motive force derived from an antecedent act of the will bearing upon the object of the action. The object of a tendency becomes an objective which is to be imposed by the mind as we try to make the best of what faces us by bringing it into conformity with practical truth. 1, c. [29] Lottin, op. 1, sed contra, ad 3; q. 4, a. Experience, Practical knowledge also depends on experience, and of course the intelligibility of. The two fullest commentaries on this article that I have found are J. [19] S.T. However, to deny the one status is not to suppose the other, for premises and a priori forms do not exhaust the modes of principles of rational knowledge. One might translate, An intelligibility is all that would be included in the meaning of a word that is used correctly if the things referred to in that use were fully known in all ways relevant to the aspect then signified by the word in question. He points out, to begin with, that the first principle of practical reason must be based on the intelligibility of good, by analogy with the primary theoretical principle which is based on the intelligibility of being. Explanation: #KEEPONLEARNING Advertisement Still have questions? It is the mind charting what is to be, not merely recording what already is. The way to avoid these difficulties is to understand that practical reason really does not know in the same way that theoretical reason knows. Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with, As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. Aquinass understanding of the first principle of practical reason avoids the dilemma of these contrary positions. Consequently, when Aquinas wishes to indicate strict obligation he often uses a special mode of expression to make this idea explicit. This early treatment of natural law is saturated with the notion of end. If the first principle of practical reason restricted human good to the goods proportionate to nature, then a supernatural end for human action would be excluded. But must every end involve good? J. Robert Oppenheimer. [34] This end, of course, does not depend for realization on human action, much less can it be identified with human action. However, when the question concerns what we shall do, the first principle of practical reason assumes control and immediately puts us in a nontheoretical frame of mind. Aquinas assumes no a priori forms of practical reason. Rather, it is primarily a principle of actions. The basic precepts of natural law are no less part of the minds original equipment than are the evident principles of theoretical knowledge. To the third argument, that law belongs to reason and that reason is one, Aquinas responds that reason indeed is one in itself, and yet that natural law contains many precepts because reason directs everything which concerns man, who is complex. It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may use a word, such as rust, and use it correctly, without understanding all that is included in its intelligibility. 1 is wrong. Although arguments based on what the text does not say are dangerous, it is worth noticing that Aquinas does not define law as an imperative for the common good, as he easily could have done if that were his notion, but as an ordinance of reason for the common good etc. It is easy to imagine that to know is to picture an object in ones mind, but this conception of knowledge is false. [2] Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Summa theologiae (Leonine ed., Rome, 18821948), 1-2, q. 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